No 402

no 402

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To this end, the proposer may require through contractual arrangements that its suppliers and its service providers, including their subcontractors, participate in the risk management process set out in Annex I. An assessment body shall carry out an independent assessment of the suitability of both the application of the risk management process as set out in Annex I and of its results.

This assessment body shall meet the criteria listed in Annex II. Where the assessment body is not already designated by existing Union or national legislation, the proposer shall appoint its own assessment body at the earliest appropriate stage of the risk assessment process. Having completed its assessment in accordance with points a , b and c , the assessment body shall deliver the safety assessment report provided for in Article 15 and Annex III. Without prejudice to Union legislation, the proposer may choose the national safety authority as assessment body where that national safety authority offers this service and where the significant changes concern the following cases:.

When the Member State recognises the national safety authority as an assessment body, it is the responsibility of that Member State to ensure that the national safety authority fulfills the requirements set out in Annex II; In this case, the assessment body functions of the national safety authority shall be demonstrably independent of the other functions of the national safety authority.

In the cases referred in Article 9 1 a and d and Article 9 2 , the period of validity of recognition shall not exceed 5 years from the date it is granted. In this case, the request of recognition shall be made at the next application for renewal or update of the safety certificate or authorisation. In this case, the request of recognition shall be made at the next application for renewal or update of that certificate.

If the assessment body no longer satisfies the criteria set out in Annex II, the recognition body shall limit the scope of application of the recognition, suspend or withdraw the recognition, depending on the degree of non-compliance. Where the risk assessment for a significant change is not to be mutually recognised, the proposer shall appoint an assessment body meeting at least the competency, independency and impartiality requirements of Annex II.

The other requirements of paragraph 1 in Annex II may be relaxed in agreement with the national safety authority in a non-discriminatory way. They shall also notify any change to that situation within one month of the change. The Agency shall make this information publicly available.

By no later than 21 May , the national accreditation body shall inform the Agency of the assessment bodies accredited, as well as of the area of competence for which those assessment bodies are accredited as provided for in points 2 and 3 of Annex II.

They shall also notify any change to that situation within 1 month of the change. By no later than 21 May , the recognition body shall inform the Agency of the assessment bodies recognised, as well as of the area of competence for which those assessment bodies are recognised as provided for in points 2 and 3 of Annex II. The Agency shall organise, in collaboration with the European cooperation for Accreditation EA , training on this Regulation for the national accreditation bodies and for the recognition bodies at least at each new revision of this Regulation.

The assessment body shall provide the proposer with a safety assessment report in accordance with the requirements set out in Annex III. The proposer shall be responsible for determining if and how to take into account the conclusions of the safety assessment report for the safety acceptance of the assessed change. The proposer shall justify and document the part of the safety assessment report for which the proposer eventually disagrees.

In the case referred to in point b of Article 2 3 , in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Article, the declaration referred to in Article 16 shall be accepted by the national safety authority in its decision to authorise the placing in service of structural subsystems and vehicles.

In the case referred to in point a of Article 2 3 , in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Article, the declaration referred to in Article 16 shall be accepted by the notified body in charge of delivering the conformity certificate, unless it justifies and documents its doubts concerning the assumptions made or the appropriateness of the results.

When a system or part of a system has already been accepted following the risk management process specified in this Regulation, the resulting safety assessment report shall not be called into question by any other assessment body in charge of performing a new assessment for the same system.

Mutual recognition shall be conditional upon demonstration that the system will be used under the same functional, operational and environmental conditions as the already accepted system, and that equivalent risk acceptance criteria have been applied.

Based on the results of the application of this Regulation and on the safety assessment report provided by the assessment body, the proposer shall produce a written declaration that all identified hazards and associated risks are controlled to an acceptable level.

The report shall also include a synthesis of the decisions on the level of significance of the changes. The Agency shall gather this information in coordination with the respective certification bodies. The Agency shall coordinate the sharing of experience with these entities in charge of maintenance and with the national safety authorities.

The Agency shall collect all information on the experience of the application of this Regulation and shall, when necessary, make recommendations to the Commission with a view to improving this Regulation. Before 21 May the Agency shall submit to the Commission a report containing:. The national safety authorities shall support the Agency in collecting such information.

References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation. This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

General principles and obligations. The risk management process shall start from a definition of the system under assessment and comprise the following activities:. This risk management process is iterative and is depicted in the diagram of the Appendix. The process ends when compliance of the system with all the safety requirements necessary to accept the risks linked to the identified hazards is demonstrated.

The risk management process shall include appropriate quality assurance activities and be carried out by competent staff. It shall be independently assessed by one or more assessment bodies. The proposer in charge of the risk management process shall maintain a hazard record in accordance with point 4.

The actors who already have in place methods or tools for risk assessment may continue to apply them if such methods or tools are compatible with the provisions of this Regulation and subject to the following conditions:. Without prejudice to civil liability in accordance with the legal requirements of the Member States, the risk assessment process shall fall within the responsibility of the proposer.

In particular the proposer shall decide, with agreement of the actors concerned, who will be in charge of fulfilling the safety requirements resulting from the risk assessment. The safety requirements assigned by the proposer to those actors shall not go beyond the scope of their responsibility and domain of control.

This decision shall depend on the type of safety measures selected to control the risks to an acceptable level. The demonstration of compliance with the safety requirements shall be conducted in accordance with point 3. The proposer is responsible for coordinating close collaboration between the different actors involved, according to their respective tasks, in order to manage the hazards and their associated safety measures.

Evaluation of the correct application of the risk management process falls within the responsibility of the assessment body. For each interface relevant to the system under assessment and without prejudice to specifications of interfaces defined in relevant TSIs, the rail-sector actors concerned shall cooperate in order to identify and manage jointly the hazards and related safety measures that need to be handled at these interfaces.

The management of shared risks at the interfaces shall be coordinated by the proposer. If, in order to fulfil a safety requirement, an actor identifies the need for a safety measure that it cannot implement itself, it shall, after agreement with another actor, transfer the management of the related hazard to the latter in accordance with the process set out in point 4.

For the system under assessment, any actor who discovers that a safety measure is non-compliant or inadequate is responsible for notifying it to the proposer, who shall in turn inform the actor implementing the safety measure. The actor implementing the safety measure shall then inform all the actors affected by the problem either within the system under assessment or, as far as known by the actor, within other existing systems using the same safety measure.

When agreement cannot be reached between two or more actors it is the responsibility of the proposer to find a solution. When a requirement in a notified national rule cannot be fulfilled by an actor, the proposer shall seek advice from the relevant competent authority. Independently from the definition of the system under assessment, the proposer is responsible for ensuring that the risk management covers the system itself and its integration into the railway system as a whole.

The risk assessment process shall interact with hazard management in accordance with point 4. A hazard identification shall be carried out on the defined system, in accordance with point 2. The risk acceptability of the system under assessment shall be evaluated by using one or more of the following risk acceptance principles:. In accordance with the principle referred to in point 1. The proposer shall demonstrate in the risk evaluation that the selected risk acceptance principle is adequately applied.

The proposer shall also check that the selected risk acceptance principles are used consistently. The application of these risk acceptance principles shall identify possible safety measures that make the risk s of the system under assessment acceptable.

Among these safety measures, those selected to control the risk s shall become the safety requirements to be fulfilled by the system. Compliance with these safety requirements shall be demonstrated in accordance with point 3.

The iterative risk assessment process is considered to be completed when it is demonstrated that all safety requirements are fulfilled and no additional reasonably foreseeable hazards have to be considered. The proposer shall systematically identify, using wide-ranging expertise from a competent team, all reasonably foreseeable hazards for the whole system under assessment, its functions where appropriate and its interfaces. All identified hazards shall be registered in the hazard record in accordance with point 4.

To focus the risk assessment efforts upon the most important risks, the hazards shall be classified according to the estimated risk arising from them. Based on expert judgement, hazards associated with a broadly acceptable risk need not be analysed further but shall be registered in the hazard record. Their classification shall be justified in order to allow independent assessment by an assessment body. As a criterion, risks resulting from hazards may be classified as broadly acceptable when the risk is so small that it is not reasonable to implement any additional safety measure.

The expert judgement shall take into account that the contribution of all the broadly acceptable risks does not exceed a defined proportion of the overall risk. During the hazard identification, safety measures may be identified. They shall be registered in the hazard record in accordance with point 4. The hazard identification only needs to be carried out at a level of detail necessary to identify where safety measures are expected to control the risks in accordance with one of the risk acceptance principles referred to in point 2.

Iteration may be necessary between the risk analysis and the risk evaluation phases until a sufficient level of detail is reached for the identification of hazards. Whenever a code of practice or a reference system is used to control the risk, hazard identification may be limited to:. Use of codes of practice and risk evaluation. The proposer, with the support of other involved actors, shall analyse whether one, several or all hazards are appropriately covered by the application of relevant codes of practice.

They must be widely recognised in the railway domain. If this is not the case, the codes of practice will have to be justified and be acceptable to the assessment body;. They must be relevant for the control of the considered hazards in the system under assessment. Successful application of a code of practice for similar cases to manage changes and control effectively the identified hazards of a system in the sense of this Regulation is sufficient for it to be considered as relevant;.

Upon request, they must be available to assessment bodies for them to either assess or, where relevant, mutually recognise, in accordance with Article 15 5 , the suitability of both the application of the risk management process and of its results. If one or more hazards are controlled by codes of practice fulfilling the requirements of point 2.

This means that:. Where an alternative approach is not fully compliant with a code of practice, the proposer shall demonstrate that the alternative approach pursued leads to at least the same level of safety. If the risk for a particular hazard cannot be made acceptable by the application of codes of practice, additional safety measures shall be identified by applying one of the two other risk acceptance principles.

When all hazards are controlled by codes of practice, the risk management process may be limited to:. Use of reference system and risk evaluation. The proposer, with the support of other involved actors, shall analyse whether one, several or all hazards are appropriately covered by a similar system that could be taken as a reference system.

If a reference system fulfils the requirements listed in point 2. If the system under assessment deviates from the reference system, the risk evaluation shall demonstrate that the system under assessment reaches at least the same safety level as the reference system, applying another reference system or one of the two other risk acceptance principles.

The risks associated with the hazards covered by the reference system shall, in that case, be considered as acceptable. If at least the same safety level as the reference system cannot be demonstrated, additional safety measures shall be identified for the deviations, applying one of the two other risk acceptance principles. Explicit risk estimation and evaluation. If the hazards are not covered by one of the two risk acceptance principles laid down in points 2.

Risks resulting from these hazards shall be estimated either quantitatively or qualitatively, taking existing safety measures into account. The acceptability of the estimated risks shall be evaluated using risk acceptance criteria either derived from or based on requirements contained in Union legislation or in notified national rules. Depending on the risk acceptance criteria, the acceptability of the risk may be evaluated either individually for each associated hazard or the combination of all hazards as a whole considered in the explicit risk estimation.

If the estimated risk is not acceptable, additional safety measures shall be identified and implemented in order to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. If the risk associated with one hazard or a combination of several hazards is considered acceptable, the identified safety measures shall be registered in the hazard record.

If hazards arise from failures of technical systems not covered by codes of practice or the use of a reference system, the following risk acceptance criterion shall apply for the design of the technical system:. For technical systems where a functional failure has a credible direct potential for a catastrophic consequence, the associated risk does not have to be reduced further if the rate of that failure is less than or equal to 10 —9 per operating hour. If a technical system is developed by applying the 10 —9 criterion laid down in point 2.

Nevertheless, if the proposer can demonstrate that the national safety level in the Member State of application can be maintained with a rate of failure higher than 10 —9 per operating hour, this criterion may be used by the proposer in that Member State.

The explicit risk estimation and evaluation shall satisfy at least the following requirements:. Minor changes in input assumptions or prerequisites shall not result in significantly different requirements. Prior to the safety acceptance of the change, fulfilment of the safety requirements resulting from the risk assessment phase shall be demonstrated under the supervision of the proposer.

This demonstration shall be carried out by each of the actors responsible for fulfilling the safety requirements, as decided in accordance with point 1. The approach chosen for demonstrating compliance with the safety requirements as well as the demonstration itself shall be independently assessed by an assessment body. Any inadequacy of safety measures expected to fulfil the safety requirements or any hazards discovered during the demonstration of compliance with the safety requirements shall lead to reassessment and evaluation of the associated risks by the proposer in accordance with point 2.

The new hazards shall be registered in the hazard record in accordance with point 4. Hazard record s shall be created or updated where they already exist by the proposer during design and implementation until acceptance of the change or delivery of the safety assessment report.

A hazard record shall track the progress in monitoring risks associated with the identified hazards. Once the system has been accepted and is in operation, the hazard record shall be further maintained by the infrastructure manager or the railway undertaking in charge of the operation of the system under assessment as an integrated part of its safety management system.

The hazard record shall include all hazards, together with all related safety measures and system assumptions identified during the risk assessment process. It shall contains a clear reference to the origin of the hazards and to the selected risk acceptance principles and clearly identify the actor s in charge of controlling each hazard. All hazards and related safety requirements that cannot be controlled by one actor alone shall be communicated to another relevant actor in order to find jointly an adequate solution.

The hazards registered in the hazard record of the actor who transfers them shall only be regarded as controlled when the evaluation of the risks associated with these hazards is made by the other actor and the solution is agreed by all concerned.

The risk management process used to assess the safety levels and compliance with safety requirements shall be documented by the proposer in such a way that all the necessary evidence showing the suitability of both the application of the risk management process and of its results are accessible to an assessment body. The documentation produced by the proposer under point 5. The assessment body shall establish its conclusion in a safety assessment report as defined in Annex III.

If you want to save silver lions, you can bring a mix of the two shells. The BR works great as well. The last aspect to overcome is the painful gun depression. Make sure to fight on flat ground so you do not have to aim down. Even if you fight in an urban environment, be careful in the streets, since some curbsides lift up one of your tracks and may prevent you from aiming at an opponent.

As the tank's design purpose suggests, the IS-2 is a heavy tank built with an emphasis on engaging hostile armoured vehicles as well as a breakthrough tank. The tanks heavy armour retains the similar properties of its IS-1 and previous KV line of battle-tanks but introduces some sloped armour on the front plate and turret mantlet.

Differing from its IS-1 predecessor, the IS-2 comes equipped with the large mm DT gun and a slightly more armoured but elongated turret. Although powerful, the DT main cannon of the IS-2 is encumbered by a slow reload time, mimicking that of the Soviet Tank-Destroyer line of vehicles at around the mid seconds.

Nevertheless, this vehicle with its powerful cannon and shell will commonly destroy almost all but the most heavily armoured vehicles with a single shot, behaving similarly to the older KV-2 predecessor, albeit with half the time required for reloading. In the tank's Battle-Rating and Rank, the armour of the IS-2 no longer stands up to much punishment with the advent of opponents with more powerful weaponry, and caution should be taken.

Close-quarters combat and brawling against more than one target at a time is highly discouraged due to the long reload speed unless the tank operator is trapped and situation requires this as an absolute necessity. Alternatively, if escorted and accompanied by other friendly tanks, the IS-2 can be supplemented and perform better in dire close-quarters situations.

If you are to apply bushes onto the IS-2, consider putting most of them on upper frontal hull and the curved sides next to it. This is because that quite some opponents will automatically target the curved armour, knowing that area is a common weak spot when the IS is angling.

By covering up the hull front and the curves, the IS's frontal hull will now look flatter, somewhat resembling the hull of an IS-2 For any leftover bushes, the turret front and the lower front plate are also good spots to put them on. In Arcade, the IS-2 proves to be quite mobile when fully upgraded. Thus, it's easy to gain a kill at the start of the match, if you are comfortable with the mm gun.

Hence why it's advised to use your improved reverse speed to quickly disengage after shooting and retreating towards your teammates, who will likely be able to return fire. If the map forces you to fight in close quarters, attempt to get into a position where your teammates can cover your sides, while you can face forwards and clear the road.

If the map allows, you can try taking 5 rounds of ammunition and camp at a capture point usually one that's given to your team to snipe all enemies that enter your line of sight while reducing your chances of blowing up at the first incoming shot. In rare cases, it's possible to rush with the IS-2 and surprise lighter vehicles at a contested capture point in the early stages of a game. This strategy relies on the capture point being unpopular and being lucky to face only one enemy vehicle at a time.

Some light tanks are unable to penetrate the IS-2 frontally, especially if they are from a much lower rank e. BT-7 , the Puma or the R3 , so that's an added benefit of being a decently mobile heavy tank. If successful, the IS-2 can then flank to other objectives or advance to the enemy spawn to destroy another enemy or two. You shouldn't expect a lot of easy targets with this strategy, because it exposes your tank to potentially a lot of enemy fire.

In Realistic, the IS-2 begins to feel like a heavy tank. Its mobility is heavily reduced and its speed is outmatched by practically everything, mostly due to poor acceleration off-roads. However, this should be used as an advantage to gauge where the enemies are set-up, by looking where your teammates are killed from.

You can then decide to return fire, although sometimes opponents don't show themselves until later in the match, in which case you should stay passive and try to remain behind your team's front lines. Due to generally increased map size in Realistic, you will have to get comfortable with the bullet drop. Now, the IS-2 performs decently well at longer ranges, but it will cost you a lot if you miss or don't penetrate, because the reload is so long. Often, you will need to rely on the rangefinder, the teammates or map knowledge to gauge how high you need to shoot, so it might be a great idea to take out another vehicle first such as the T or T remember the distance and then take the IS-2 out.

However, on larger maps, it is generally a better idea to take out other vehicles. A more reliable strategy for the IS-2 is to camp nearby an objective and pick off any enemies who pose a threat. Just make sure to find a flat spot with cover, because your poor gun depression and long reload will be your death in hilly or open areas. It's also a good idea to target heavy enemies, because they are easier to hit, and also will likely pose a larger threat to your general team e.

Although classified as a heavy tank and an upgraded improved design over the KV predecessor, the IS-2's armour will no longer hold up to its more common and heavier opponents of its battle rating. Compared with other vehicles such as the new German Tiger II, American heavy T-series tanks; most of which can easily deflect even the most powerful shots of the IS-2 unless targeted specifically and known weak-spots. Because of this, it is recommended to always travel and fight in groups of two or more vehicles.

The slow and difficult in the manoeuvring of the vehicle especially in confined spaces will more than once place the IS-2 in significant danger. It is recommended to field the IS-2 into a fire-support role, peeking over the shoulder of friendly, more heavier vehicles and firing a shot against the opposition in tandem. During situations where engagement is expected, an unorthodox strategy can be utilized where the operator of the IS-2 tank repositions the vehicle 90 degrees and drive in reverse with the rear-facing towards the enemy.

By driving in reverse this way, the engine blocks make a crude yet somewhat effective shield to protect the more delicate crew members. As the fuel tanks are mostly stored at the front on the left and right side of the driver's station, the risk of fire and fuel-tank explosion is reduced significantly but not completely eliminated and thus, the tank is able to resist even the most powerful of shots.

Be aware that more experienced players may attempt to instead fire at the more exposed turret of the IS tank and instantly knocking out the crew with a common APHE penetrating shell in this way. Despite the overall below-average protection for a heavy tank, the IS-2 can actually act as a shell magnet without being penetrated, and take shots to protect weaker teammates..

The IS-2 can take advantage of the tactic of "side-scraping" thanks to its sturdily thick side armour and fast reverse speed. First find some solid cover and hide the IS-2's frontal area behind it, then point the rear hull outside a bit so you can reverse and peek the back half of the hull out, at an angle that is overall parallel from the direction of incoming shots.

Now what the enemy should see is a part of your hull side forming a very small angle of incidence. Due to the fact that not a lot tankers know this tactic, they will usually take the bait and fire at your side armour. If they do not take the bait, wiggle around a bit to pretend that you are distracted. The shell will either hit the side armour and ricochet away, or damage the track but not break it.

This way, you can safely lure the enemy to fire first, then poke out and finish them with your powerful cannon. So if you know they are present, do not use this tactic. Rather, wait until they fire at a teammate or are distracted. Another factor to take into account is the curved armour connecting the front and the side, it will increase the incidence angle of enemy shells, resulting in you being penetrated, so do not expose too much of the side.

In regards to shells, the DT cannon is also equipped with a powerful high-explosive HE shell. Firing a HE shell with precise aim directly underneath the chassis of enemy vehicles where the armour, like on the top of the vehicle if thin, can cripple or instantly destroy said enemy vehicles with the overpressure damage mechanics.

In rare instances, the HE shell of the DT is so powerful to the point two or more medium or heavy tanks close to each other can be destroyed with a single exploding HE Shell. Alternatively, the powerful armour-piercing capability of the DT cannon's APHE rounds has also been documented to pierce two or three light-armoured targets without exploding.

As previously specified above, The IS-2 no longer retains its armour advantage in this Battle-Rating and Rank un-likes its IS-1 predecessor and thus, it is important to identify and fire on targets first before they do. In this rank, Tanks such as the Panthers, Tiger II and similar vehicles will be present with sloped armour, strong enough to even withstand the might of the mm Shells of the DT gun.

A common design flaw, however, is the turret of said vehicles, commonly being mostly blunt and flat and easy to penetrate. A patient and well placed aim and shot against these surfaces will destroy the target with no more than a single shot. Be aware that most opposition vehicles at this rank have the lower calibre and puncturing power than the DT of the IS-2, but come with an improved reload speed, a reload speed commonly faster than the IS Japanese line of tanks at the same rank as the IS-2 is of little concern; their poor armour and armaments at the same rank will render them relatively easy to destroy.

An important note when engaging tanks, especially Tiger I's, is that, with the implementation of volumetric shells, you can no longer expect your shells to pierce through small openings or right past an obstacle. The large mm calibre of your shells will result in it catching on an armour plate's edge very often, losing all of its penetration.

For example, a Tiger I has some edges that can absorb your shell unexpectedly, despite having flat armour. Thus you must always make sure that where you are aiming at is absolutely free of obstruction, or it may result in a non-penetration or a ricochet.

This can be seen in the diagram to the right. Another specific enemy vehicle worth noting is the German Ferdinand tank destroyer. Most new players in Rank IV battles fielding the IS-2 may commonly mistake the front armour of the Ferdinand as appearing as thin as similar-looking tank destroyers such the Nashorn and are commonly caught unaware that almost the entire front of the Ferdinand consists entirely of heavy mm and mm plate armour, the largest being the fighting compartment located behind the driving compartment.

Due to it being such a large target, many players including both IS-2 users and other vehicle type users alike will be tempted into firing at that portion expecting easy wins, only for almost all shots to be absorbed, even the powerful shells of the DT.

It is recommended to avoid engaging the Ferdinand or ignore it entirely. If the opportunity arises, Ferdinand's weaker side and rear armour should be targeted 80 mm. In Realistic Battles, the Jagdtiger is a similarly tough nut to crack. The effective thickness of its front varies between and mm and thus can resist any shell the IS-2 fires.

So, it is not recommended to engage it frontally, with the only dangerous option being disabling its gun barrel. Shoot at its side or rear, the BRB shell is recommended as its great overmatching ability allows you to fire with some angle and still penetrate, maximising the chance of success. When firing at extremely light-armoured targets such as the M19 , aim for where the crew is located as the fuze on the mm rounds tend to not set off when going through thin plates of armour, so if it hits an empty area the over-penetrations will cause no damage.

However, an over-penetration through a crew compartment can usually knock out 1 to 3 crew members. It is not angled and has a thickness of 90 mm.

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